Information Operations &
Psychological Operations in Iraq

Gulf War – 2 Operation Iraqi Freedom

Following Gulf War-1, the UN imposed economic sanctions on Iraq and imposed a nuclear weapons inspection process, while the US maintained a no-fly zone over northern and southern Iraq. After the 9/11 Terrorist attacks on the US and the resulting invasion of Afghanistan, President George Bush (2) launched a public diplomacy campaign to remove Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq. Perhaps the most important difference between Gulf-1 and Gulf-2 was the availability of the Internet.

Pre-Conflict IO

"F**k Saddam, we're taking him out." –President Bush to three U.S. Senators in March 2002, a full year before the Iraq invasion

Prior to war with Iraq, the US goals were two-fold: 1) to enforce Iraqi compliance with the UN weapons inspection program to destroy any Iraqi WMDs, and 2) to build support for an invasion to remove Hussein from power. The primary arguments included: Iraq’s threat to use WMDs, Iraq’s failure to comply with UN weapons inspections, and Iraq’s support of and connection to al-Qaeda.

Hussein remained uncooperative and claimed that Iraq had destroyed its WMDs, but failed to produce evidence supporting the claim. Unlike Gulf War-1, evidence of Iraqi transgressions was not obvious and required definitive proof to make the case for war. The key event was the testimony of Secretary of State Colin Powell (former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs during Gulf-1) at the United Nations.

The scene at the UN was reminiscent of Adlai Stevenson’s testimony during the Cuban Missile Crisis, as the world waited for the unequivocal proof. Instead of the aerial photographs of Russian missiles in Cuba, Powell produced little more than PowerPoint drawings and empty words, but no documentary proof to support the concerns of National Security Advisor Condoleeza Rice relating to the prospect of a “mushroom cloud.”

Powell’s UN presentation was the culmination of the Bush administration’s perception management campaign. In retrospect, it can be seen as a continuation of the Bush election campaign strategy and will be discussed in more detail later. Saddam, it seems, was also conducting information operations, apparently telling the truth in a way to foster doubt and suspicion.

Throughout the pre-conflict phase, opponents of the war used the Internet to build an anti-war movement. The effects were more successful globally than in the US and helped erode support for UN resolutions authorizing the war and for participation in the US-led coalition. The US response to anti-war sentiment helped undermine its own objectives. The Bush administration resorted to its political strategy of attacking and disparaging its opponents. Europeans, especially the French, were characterized as being as weak and ineffectual as the UN. American’s anti-French sentiment renamed French fries as freedom fries, as the nation marched forward down the path to unilateral, pre-emptive war.

Although US victory was a foregone conclusion, the neoconservatives pushing for the invasion of Iraq presumably were equally optimistic about the prospects for democratic nation building, a complex process for which the US was woefully ill prepared. Having offended the UN and traditional allies, the US took on the enormous burden for a process with which it had little experience.  

Information Warfare

The IW campaign was essentially similar to that used in Gulf-1, including: 1) leaflet drops to troops and the general population; 2) a “shock and awe” air bombardment; 3) attacks and electronic warfare (EW) against Iraqi command, control and communication (C3) network.

The dramatic new element was authorization for deployment of embedded reporters. This was an unusually risky decision, presumably motivated, at least in part, by the shortcomings of the pre-war IO program. Live video and reporting from the war front would surely appeal to the media, increase viewership and public interest, while distracting from other events and denying Iraqi access to media coverage. The use of embedded reporters is generally seen as a resounding success.

The staple activity of IW during combat operations is leaflet drops. The military views this as a function of psychological operations, although the tactics are relatively rudimentary and straight-forward and not what the general public assumes to be PSYOPS, ala the Manchurian Candidate.

Gen. Tommy Franks estimated that 28 million leaflets were dropped over Iraq. Hundreds of different leaflets were used, often custom-tailored and produced rapidly for specific situations. There are two primary audiences: the general public and enemy forces. Virtually all are similar and sound like commands: “Do (this) and be safe,” or “Do (that) and you will die.”

Typical public messages include:

“Stay Indoors…and you will be safe.”
“Stay away from all soldiers…the Iraqi people are our enemy”
“Do not carry weapons…and you will be safe.”
“Do not interfere with coalition soldiers…we will liberate you from Saddam’s tyranny.”
“Listen to these radio stations for information about military operations in this area.”

Typical messages for enemy soldiers include:

“Do not start oil fires, the oil industry is your livelihood.”
“Do not use weapons of mass destruction or you will be killed.”
”Do not use WMDs, we have protective gear, but you will be killed.”
“Do not be killed for Saddam, to surrender follow these instructions.”
“Coalition forces can see everything, you will be held responsible.”
“Stay back 100 meters or you will be shot.”

Leaflet drops are generally considered part of PSYOPS. The messages, however, reveal a simplistic military style, “you will…” approach to psychology. Regrettably, this approach carried forward to post-conflict operations.

As in Gulf -1, the combat phase was relatively brief. Iraqi forces were denied almost all forms of C3, forcing individual units to operate blind. Despite such formidable problems, the Iraqi desertion and surrender rates were considerably less than in Gulf-1. Although many Iraqi soldiers simply went home to avoid combat with superior forces, other units offered significant resistance.

Presumably, the reason for Iraq’s better showing was that this battle was fought on Iraqi soil in defense of their homeland, rather than as an aggressor. In addition, events since 9/11 had publicized and highlighted the anti-western cause behind Islamic extremism. Access to Al-Jazeera provided Iraqis with new insights and information about terrorism and the Islamist complaints about US policy and activities in the Muslim world. It’s unclear how much this contributed to a stronger Iraqi resistance, but it is clear that it was a significant factor in fueling the subsequent insurgency.

Despite the Iraqi resistance, Baghdad soon fell to US-led forces and Iraqis were seen pulling down the statue of Saddam Hussein a Firdos Square - or so it seemed. Skeptics claim this event was orchestrated as part of the US PSYOPS campaign. It probably was, but the truth makes little difference.

"My belief is we will, in fact, be greeted as liberators."
–Vice President Dick Cheney,
"Meet the Press," March 16, 2003

This event is a classic example of perception management. Everyone saw what happened; a small group of Iraqis, with assistance from US soldiers, tore down the statue of Saddam. Either this was a sincere, spontaneous expression of liberation jubilation, or it was poorly crafted PSYOPS intended to create that impression – to manage perception. The reason it doesn’t matter is that people will believe and accept the version of truth that confirms their own perspective.

This truism is both good and bad news for IO and Psyops practitioners. The bad news is that it is always extremely difficult to change people’s strongly held beliefs and attitudes no matter how much contrary evidence is provided. The good news is that people who share one’s beliefs and attitudes will believe almost anything that supports their pre-existing positions. Hence, IO can be an effective way to help solidify support where people are predisposed to agree with the message. It’s also conceivable that cleverly crafted PSYOPS messages can sometimes be used to create doubts and weaken resolve. Most military PSYOPS programs are disappointing compared to the public’s expectations.

The Firdos Sq. incident also points out the problem controlling weapons of mass perception. US law prohibits targeting domestic (American) audiences with propaganda. It would be impossible to claim that the staged toppling of Saddam's statue was not intended for international audiences, including the US.

Post-Conflict IO

"It's hard to conceive that it would take more forces to provide stability in post-Saddam Iraq than it would take to conduct the war itself and to secure the surrender of Saddam’s security forces and his army. Hard to imagine." –Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz, testifying before the House Budget Committee prior to the Iraq war, Feb. 27, 2003

If you have never been oppressed or conquered it’s probably difficult to really know what it feels like, or what effect it has on a person’s psyche. Apparently, US leaders invaded Iraq, knowing they would win easily and simply expected a happy ending, demonstrating “group think” and lack of imagination. As a result, post-conflict plans of any type were woefully inadequate, including those related to IO.

After liberating Kuwait in 1991, the Kuwaiti rulers returned to power and resumed governing the country. Obviously, this would not be the case in Iraq, yet IO planners seemed to ignore the need to seize the initiative during the period of interim reorganization of a country’s government. In war, commanders expect the enemy to shoot back, a concept apparently foreign to IO as they arrived unprepared to confront a new enemy.

With major combat ended, embedded reporters crawled out of their beds and struck out on their own in the search for news stories, joined by international journalists, many of whom did not share America’s enthusiasm for a preemptive invasion. Invariably, reports would return with stories critical of US military operations. War is a brutal business where people are killed whether innocent or not, yet the US Military reacted defensively, falling back on disclaimers and denials, as if inevitable mistakes had not been made. This refusal to accept responsibility undercuts credibility.

In November 2002 a US missile struck the Al-Jazeera news headquarters in Kabul, Afghanistan; in April 2003 another US missile struck Al-Jazeera’s offices in Baghdad, killing one employee. The US Army’s response was that they thought the site was a terrorist facility, which doesn’t say mush about their intelligence (either version). This has become a story that will not go away. In November 2005, Al-Jazeera employees staged protests related to British media reports that President Bush had wanted to attack Al-Jazeera and had to be dissuaded by British P.M., Tony Blair.

The Iraqi people greeted the downfall of Saddam’s regime with cautious optimism, hopeful that it would prove true, fearful of an uncertain future and with high expectations of the rich and powerful Americans. As days turned into weeks and months of confusion, constant power blackouts, and an absence of definitive authority to which they were accustomed, hope gradually turned to disappointment and frustration. As Iraqis sat in the sweltering darkness, Saddam remained free, WMDs remained invisible and American credibility eroded daily.

By the end of June 2003, US Administrator Paul Bremer put an end to local elections and installed handpicked mayors and began a policy banning former members of Saddam’s Ba’ath political party from government positions. This action, combined with disbanding the Iraqi army helped inflame anti-American sentiment among those who had prospered under Saddam, regardless of their real allegiance. In August, Sergio Vieira de Mello, highly regarded UN High Commissioner for Human Rights was killed by a truck bomb. In December 2003, Saddam Hussein was captured while hiding in a rat-hole in Tikrit.

On March 31, 2004, “four American civilians were dragged from their burning vehicles and killed. Their bodies were mutilated. A crowd of more than 1,000 beat and dragged the corpses behind automobiles and hung the remains from a bridge spanning the Euphrates River.”

In late April 2004, news reports broke the story of prisoner abuse at Abu Ghraib prison near Baghdad. Horrific photos surfaced and circulated worldwide. After promising a thorough investigation and disciplinary action, the U.S. Army delivered, what opponent’s claim was a white-wash. The search for culpability up the chain of command stalled out at the sergeant level. Meanwhile, new stories emerged about detention-torture centers and outsourcing of “interrogation” to other allied countries where torture is acceptable.

In May, Islamic extremists kidnapped and decapitated American Nick Berg in what became a series of such gruesome incidents. Throughout the second half of 2003 and 2004, insurgent attacks, kidnappings, beheadings, suicide bombings, car bombings and street shootings grew in number and lethality.

By year’s end the UN and most NGOs had pulled their staffs out of Iraq. Western reporters were no longer free to travel around the country and significant combat operations were launched against suspected insurgent and terrorist strongholds across Iraq.

Iraq held its first round of elections in early 2005 and Iraqis proudly displayed their inked fingers as proof that they had voted. The inked finger campaign has been an IO success, wherever the idea originated and has become a symbol of Iraq’s quest for democracy.

“The United States could have the Prophet Muhammad doing public relations and it wouldn’t help.” -wrote Osama Sibliani, publisher of the Arab American News.

Instead, President Bush tasked some of his most loyal and trusted advisors to reshape public opinion in the Middle East. Leading the public diplomacy initiative were Secretary of State, Condoleeza Rice and Karen Hughes, the president’s long-time press aide. And they enlisted First Lady, Laura Bush. This brainstorm could have been conjured up only one source, Saddam’s public affairs guru, Baghdad Bob.

Whether one is selling painkillers, panaceas or public policy, a fundamental precept of advertising is to select a credible, trusted spokesperson. What could be worse than sending western women to tell Arab men mend their ways? Taking a page from Sean Hannity’s playbook, the US goodwill emissaries proceeded to encourage Muslim women to cast off their veils, burn their bras and join the women’s liberation movement.

Watching from their caves, Bin Laden and his associates must have thought, “With enemies like this, who needs friends?” America appeared hell-bent on confirming Islamic radicals fears of renewed “westoxification.”

In July 2005, the Iraqi leadership announced a cooperative security agreement with Iran that would include Iran training Iraqi security forces. The news shocked US leaders and the story was quickly buried as if it had never happened.

In November, the L.A. Times broke a story revealing that the U.S. Military was paying to place news stories in Iraqi newspapers as part of its PSYOPS programs. Such activities could undermine the credibility of a free press and enable insurgents to call into question the veracity of virtually any pro-American news reports.

As my father often said, “You can’t make a silk purse out of a sow’s ear, but it doesn’t stop a jackass from trying.”

What’s Wrong With This Picture?

The recent US approach to post-conflict IO demonstrates what happens when IPI and IO activities are not planned and coordinated as an integral part of strategy and aren’t implemented in a thoughtful and professional manner.

The critical reader may note that little has been said describing actual post-conflict information operations programs. There’s an explanation for this. There haven’t been many programs and what little has been attempted is often classified. The logical question is: Why would information disseminated to the Iraqi public be classified?

As revealed by the LA Time’s (11/30/2005), many of the IO and PSYOPS products are prepared under US Military direction and distributed as if they were Iraqi in origin; fees are paid to place materials in newspapers, radio, or television media outlets. This revelation not only tainted the credibility of the fledgling Iraqi media story, but reinforced worldwide suspicion, or "perception," about the source and truth of any pro-American news stories anywhere.

This is not winning hearts and minds. It’s a futile attempt to buy good news and good coverage instead of earning it. It’s also counter productive, unnecessary and very expensive.

The basic concept of public relations is to do good deeds and be credited for them.

In the case of Iraq, this would entail such things as: providing security, providing electricity, repairing war damage, improving schools, re-invigorating the economy, repairing streets, bridges and sewers, re-establishing agricultural production and so forth. These are the essentials that matter to ordinary people. Building a democracy is not.

There are no democracies in the Middle East, and there never have been. Most people of the region don’t really understand the concept and given modest prosperity wouldn’t care. Arab leaders of neighboring states understand the notion of democracy; to them it would be a revolution that drives them from power. Hence, America can expect little or no support in its crusade for democracy.

The simple fact is, spreading democracy matters only to the Bush administration, not because of any profound commitment to the goal, but as a means to justify a war, whose original justifications proved erroneous. Period. If the US were really committed to democratization and nation building, we’d still be seriously engaged in Haiti, or Somalia.

The problem is that Iraqis are intelligent and clever with a long, long history dealing with those who sought to exploit and control them. It’s difficult to con a con man, yet that’s what we’re trying to do and they’re not buying it. There was a window of opportunity to earn Iraqi support, but when the US failed to meet Iraqis high expectations the window began to slide shut as the back door creaked open, providing a similar opportunity for US adversaries.

The Coalition’s IO messages have been crudely ineffectual, disjointed and simplistic, while the US has failed to find a credible voice or the right spokespersons to carry the right message. Product endorsements by Condi Rice, Karen Hughes and Laura Bush are the answer. Cultural revolution is not the message. 

At this juncture, it’s accurate to say that even the Prophet Mohammed couldn’t make a silk purse out of this sow’s ear. Nonetheless, Iraq can provide lessons learned, if we’re willing to learn them.