“There are known knowns. There are things we know we know. We also know there are known unknowns; that is to say we know there are some things we don’t know. But there are also unknown unknowns-the ones we don’t know we don’t know.” - Warrior-philosopher, Donald Rumsfeld US Secretary of Defense
This tortured logic aptly describes America’s understanding of Islamic extremism. Although much is known, there remains a fog of confusion surrounding the problem of international terrorism and what to do about it. The phenomenon has been described as a bizarre mutation of violence, a holy war, and a clash of civilizations. America has declared war on terrorism, yet cannot define the enemy, nor agree on whether such a war against an intangible adversary can actually be won.
Terrorism experts track every terrorist incident, tracking the individuals involved, or those responsible, monitoring the tools and tactics, and searching for hidden meanings behind the choice of dates. Despite the attention and money lavished on the problem, leaders can give no assurances of safety and can only warn that, “they’ll strike again, don’t know where, don’t know when.” Perhaps, it is the twisted, distorted trees that obscure the forest in which they grow.
This report traces the history and development of al-Qaeda and Usama bin Laden, searching for an over-arching perspective that can help define the problem and possibly point to realistic solutions to restore a semblance of sustainable security. Our surprising conclusion is that al-Qaeda and Islamic extremism are little different than many traditional nationalist, separatist and irredentist movements, and therein lays the prospect for resolution.
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W arrior-philosopher, Donald Rumsfeld US Secretary of Defense has explained that, “There are known knowns. There are things we know we know. We also know there are known unknowns; that is to say we know there are some things we don’t know. But there are also unknown unknowns-the ones we don’t know we don’t know.” This tortured logic aptly describes America’s understanding of Islamic extremism.
Three years after the attacks of 9/11, we know more than we used to about Usama bin Laden, al-Qaeda and the World Islamic Front (al-Qaeda’s global network). However, much more remains unknown. More troubling still, are the things we don’t know and don’t yet realize we must know.
Although much has been written about al-Qaeda, it is useful to re-examine the facts as we know them, alert for the possibility of identifying trends and connections, motivations and intentions that can help blunt the effect of future al-Qaeda operations, or provide insights into ways to undermine and defeat this deadly nemesis. Most analysts and experts recommend a multifaceted approach to fighting terrorism – military, criminal, economic, political, and psychological. The emphasis, however, has been almost entirely on defeating and killing terrorists. In fact, discussion of non-military methods is virtually non-existent.
One of the core causes of Islamic extremism has been the cumulative effect of US foreign policy and its conflicting messages. Examining the seeds of hate, it will become apparent that American Mid-East policies have sent the wrong signals repeatedly. Blinded by anti-communist fervor, fearful of Islamic theocracies, and concerned only with America’s selfish interests, the US could hardly have done more to motivate our potential adversaries – Ayatollah Khomeini, Saddam Hussein and Usama bin Laden.
It’s generally agreed that Islamic extremism is a phenomena that will remain well into the future, regardless of whether Usama bin Laden is neutralized. He has given life and ideology to this movement, but has, so far, failed to mobilize a global Islamic uprising. In time a new, charismatic leader might. Enduring solutions will lie in addressing the inherent anger and resentment of the Arab and Muslim world against America’s policies. It is within America’s power to develop more coherent policies in the future, but first, we must fully comprehend the nature of the enemy.
History is a great teacher and a review of Middle Eastern history reveals great achievements, a glorious past, a clash of civilizations, a pattern of authoritarian rule, an era of decline and many current problems and failings. All of these threads are woven into a complex tapestry that combines the best and worst or religion, culture, politics and civilization. In ancient times, great civilizations flourished throughout the Middle East from Afghanistan to Morocco. After the Christian Crusades, the region understandably drifted into decline and eventually became pawns of European colonial powers and the Ottoman Empire. After the world wars, the Middle East was carved into artificial nation-states, arguably designed to divide and conquer. Nationalism was pitted against pan-Arab nationalism, as powerful inheritors fought to solidify their new states, while others fought to unite the Arab people. These divisions undermined the ability and motivation for cooperation and enabled the various rulers to consolidate power.
After World War II, the United Nations voted to establish a Jewish state in Palestine against the wish and votes of all the Middle Eastern states, creating a conflict that has flared continuously ever since. The US also brought promises of increasing prosperity as its oil companies invested billions to expand development of regional oil reserves. These investments brought tremendous wealth to the kingdoms and the ruling elites, but also served as a lever to influence the policies and allegiances of Middle Eastern rulers.
In October 1973, OPEC nations announced an Arab Oil Embargo in conjunction with the Yom Kippur War. Oil prices surged and gas lines lengthened as supplies dwindled and the West recognized its strategic energy vulnerability. The balance of power in the Middle East threatened to tilt to the Arab’s favor, until it was learned that Israel had nuclear weapons and had been prepared to use them in the war, if the homeland was put at risk. What developed was a curious form of détente, as Mid-East adversary each held powerful trump cards.
Military humiliation sparked increasing dissent on the Arab street, while prospects for trickle down prosperity from Arab oil wealth evaporated like a rainstorms in the desert. Meanwhile, the US was shoring up its strategic position in the Persian Gulf by strengthening relations with the Shah of Iran. Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, a weak secular leader, was developed as a key Cold War ally to forestall possible Soviet intentions in the Persian Gulf region. The US aggressively aided Iran’s military build-up and exploitation of its vast oil reserves. As the presence of American military and businessmen in Iran grew so too did the cultural invasion - the “Westoxication” of Iran.
Although the elite prospered, Iran’s Shia Muslim religious traditions and Persian culture and heritage were seriously threatened, while the Shah became increasingly reliant on the SAVAK (Secret police) and military to repress the dissenters. Surprised by its suddenness, the CIA was caught off guard in 1979 by the Iranian Revolution that swept the Shah from power, ultimately replacing him with Ayatollah Khomeini and a theocratic Islamic state. In December 1979, the Soviets invaded Afghanistan, unleashing a decade-long resistance by the Afghan mujahadeen. In 1980, Iraq invaded southern Iran starting a war that lasted eight deadly years.
The US got involved in supporting the Afghan mujahadeen against the Soviets and the Iraqis fighting Iran – resisting Soviet aggression, but supporting Iraq’s aggression.
To Usama bin Laden and his mujahadeen brothers in fighting in Afghanistan this curious juncture revealed the duplicity and hypocrisy of US policy. While America promoted such ideals as freedom, justice, democracy and the rule of law, its actions were driven by purely selfish motives. The US broke its own code by negotiating with Iranian terrorists. As an ally of Iraq, the US sold arms to Iran. As an advocate of self-determination, the US interfered in El Salvador and Nicaragua. As an ally of the mujahadeen resistance, the US abandoned them when the Soviets withdrew in 1989, then undermined the efforts of Afghans to establish an Islamic state, leaving them to years of civil war.
Meanwhile, Saddam Hussein must have drawn similar conclusions. Barely pausing to regroup after the devastating war with Iran, he attacked the Kurds in Northern Iraq with chemical weapons, as his American backers turned a blind eye. Encouraged by America’s disinterest he soon invaded Kuwait and must have been dismayed at the negative reaction.
The Russians shifted their focus from destroying Afghanistan to devastating Muslims in Chechnya, yet avoided alienating the US or the rest of the West. In Bosnia, and later Kosovo, Christian Serbs began a pogrom of ethnic cleansing against Muslims, as the world debated what it could do.
Watching world events unfold, bin Laden and his associates surely drew their own list of conclusions and grievances. If the rag-tag mujahadeen could defeat the mighty Soviet army, it was surely Allah’s will. If the Shia Muslims of Iran could overthrow the Shah and his American made military machine, surely it was Allah’s will. If Lebanese Hizbollah could drive the Israelis out of Lebanon, surely it was Allah’s will. And is Bosnian and Kosovar Muslims could achieve independence from the powerful, genocidal Serbs, surely, this too, was Allah’s will.
If the misguided Shia could prevail over a despotic, secular tyrant, backed by the US, certainly the more righteous Sunni Muslims could do even better and establish a new Caliphate throughout the Muslim world. Events had provided motivation, Allah provided inspiration and the mujahadeen gave bin Laden a ready-made organization, to which he added his personal fortune, a share of Afghanistan’s arms and drug money. From the wreckage of Afghanistan Al-Qaeda was born.
The al-Qaeda strategy would include 10 key elements:
· A visionary, charismatic and legendary leader (or martyr): Usama bin Laden · A just and righteous cause: Islam · A vision of a better future: A future that mirrors a glorious past · A clearly defined and evil adversary: The Infidels of the US, Israel, Europe · A network for communication and mobilization: Al-Qaeda and Islamist clerics · A source of financial support: Bin Laden’s fortune, popular support, protection rackets, drug money and ultimately oil money · A base of operations: Afghanistan, Pakistan, Sudan, Somalia, etc. · A guerrilla army: The Al-Qaeda mujahadeen · A credible strategy to weaken the adversary’s resolve: Western economic adversity combined with a climate of terror and fear · The ultimate threat: Weapons of Mass Destruction and the credible threat to use them
Drawing on the lessons of Mao Tse Tung, Che Guevara, and other earlier revolutionaries, the mujahadeen had already developed their own doctrine of guerrilla warfare. Al-Qaeda prepared its own updated Terrorist Training Manual. Bin Laden and his leadership cadre developed the philosophical and religious arguments for jihad, but unlike the Iranian Shia, they lacked the leadership of a singular respected religious leader, or writers like Iran’s Jalal Al-e Ahmad to inspire followers and grow the movement. Instead, al-Qaeda developed a network of clerics from madrasses (religious schools) to recruit youngsters to the jihad. Al-Qaeda, which means “the base,” established training camps to preach the ideal of jihad and teach the necessary fundamentals. The best of these students would be sent to fight in Chechnya, or Bosnia, or deployed to establish cells in other countries.
It’s been estimated that as many as 15,000 trainees went through al-Qaeda training camps. Only rural guerrilla forces can typically win and hold territory, subject to having favorable terrain and a supportive population. The Middle East offers no such terrain, which dictates the use of urban warfare, terrorism and a distributed cell structure. It appears that al-Qaeda’s main role is to provide motivation, training, start-up funding and, to the extent possible, logistical and operational support. Its role might best be described as being a franchise, like Amway or Avon, leaving the planning and operations to local operators. This would not preclude central planning and conduct of operations.
After 9/11, the leadership would certainly have made plans to go underground and to further diffuse operating cells. Al-Qaeda has demonstrated considerable patience in planning attacks and is likely to be even more patient since 9/11. The attacks on New York and Washington while audacious and deadly in their intent, almost certainly did not anticipate the devastating results. For bin Laden and his associates the success of 9/11 has reinforced their belief that Allah is guiding their jihad.
One of the challenges to understanding al-Qaeda and anticipating future attacks might be called, “ the Allah effect.” As intelligence and security analysts pour over bits and scraps of evidence and data, they attempt to connect the dots and extrapolate the results to predict a future course of action. An essential ingredient is such analysis is logic and reason. Unfortunately, this can result in false readings and misguided conclusions if the adversary doesn’t act rationally and logically.
For instance: most people planning a crime are constrained by considerations for escape, or to preserve, or optimize their assets. Al-Qaeda’s use of suicide bombers defies this logic entirely. Iraqi insurgents have demonstrated similar disregard for human life. A basic tenet of guerrilla warfare is to preserve one’s limited personnel and resources, and to optimize their value. Such considerations appear to have little strategic or tactical relevance to al-Qaeda and must be factored in to any analysis.
Usama bin Laden hails from a wealthy Saudi family whose fortunes stem from the oil and construction business. Around 1979, he became involved in the jihad against the Soviet invaders of Afghanistan and co-founded Maktab al-Khidamat (MAK), and set-up offices throughout the world to recruit Afghan resistance fighters (mujahadeen). The mujahadeen received substantial financial and military support from the CIA and Saudi Arabia, was funneled through Pakistan to the anti-Soviet fighters.
Around the time of the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, bin Laden established Al-Qaeda (meaning “the Base”). The original mission and goals remain unclear, but having set-up an organization, recruited followers and trained and armed fighters, many dissident groups tend to evolve by identifying a new reason to exist. Having helped defeat the communist in Afghanistan, his next jihad could target the communist regime in South Yemen. This was prior to the Iraq invasion of Kuwait, the ensuing Gulf War and the arrival of US forces in the Muslim Holy Places of Saudi Arabia.
Bin Laden returned to Saudi Arabia as a celebrity until 1991, when he was expelled for his subversive, anti-government activities. During this time, it’s reported (Through Our Enemies Eyes) that bin Laden repeatedly warned the Saudis an impending Iraqi invasion and offered help in training and preparing to defend the Kingdom. When Iraq invaded Kuwait and threatened to march into Saudi Arabia, the Saudis, rejected bin Laden’s offers and, instead, invited the infidel US forces to defend them, infuriating bin Laden for violating and threatening Islam. Bin Laden declared that the al-Saud monarchy must face “the same fate as the Shah of Persia”. Bin Laden was placed under house arrest until he left for exile in Afghanistan in 1991. The events of this period were crucial to the formation of bin Laden’s ideology.
In his view, the Saudi monarchy had betrayed Islam, abdicated its legitimacy and completed the colonization of the Kingdom by the US. For years, the Saudis had capitulated to US interests by selling oil at below market prices, justifying their actions as necessary to preclude forcing the US into adopting aggressive energy efficiency measures. Now, under virtual US occupation, the al-Sauds had sold out not only the nation’s wealth, but also its very Islamic soul.
After a brief stay in Afghanistan, Bin Laden and his followers moved to Sudan in 1992. Functioning as a venture capitalist and motivated by his expulsion from Saudi Arabia, bin Laden became extremely active and productive. He established factories, agricultural ventures, commercial construction activities, banking investments that helped the Sudanese leaders from the National Islamic Front (NIF) consolidate their power. In exchange he was allowed to resettle Afghan-Arabs, set-up training camps, and pursue weapons. Exploiting his close relations with the NIF, his companies won several large infrastructure contracts, building roads and the Port Sudan airport, adding to his financial resources.
Videotapes of bin Laden reveal a soft-spoken, composed and somewhat mesmerizing speaker. In each country he visits, he reportedly acts as an effective mediator and unifying influence between factions, then opens his wallet to cement support for his commercial operations. The quid pro quo is acceptance of al-Qaeda operations. Former mujahadeen military leaders came to Sudan and organized the al-Qaeda network in East Africa, based in Kenya. Soon, al-Qaeda operatives were conducting attacks against American military personnel in Yemen and Somalia.
The infamous “Black Hawk Down” incident in Mogadishu, Somalia is attributed to training and assistance to warlord Farah Aideed by al-Qaeda mujahadeen. Presumably, bin Laden believed the UN aid mission to Somalia was little more than a pretext for a US military build-up ultimately designed to target Sudan. To bin Laden and company, the subsequent US withdrawal from Somalia confirmed their belief that the Americans couldn’t bear to sustain losses and were, therefore vulnerable anywhere.
Bin Laden can be characterized as a venture capitalist for a terrorist franchise. Al-Qaeda represents a company-owned operation that plans and conducts its own activities. In addition, the organization provides seed money, financial support and training to franchisees, or even to worthy affiliates who share their vision or confront the common enemy.
As Sudan became a base and staging area for al-Qaeda and other, increasingly active, Middle Eastern terrorist groups. The network of radical Islamic groups conducted attacks in the Philippines, Egypt, Jordan, Algeria, Yemen, Lebanon, Bosnia, Kashmir, Tajikistan, Eritrea, Uganda, Ethiopia and the first attack on the World Trade Center in New York. The US declared Sudan a “state sponsor of terrorism,” which activates a series of sanctions. In 1996, with Sudan’s NIF facing growing pressure, bin Laden moved back to Afghanistan and soon after issued his “Declaration of War against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places."
As events of 9/11 unfolded, the first question asked was, “Why would anyone do this terrible thing?” The fact is that Usama bin Laden tried to explain, but few were listening. In 1996, bin Laden issued a “Declaration of War against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places." This statement set forth a number of his grievances. In 1998, his so-called World Islamic Front released a call for “Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders.” And in November 2002, he tried again to make his points in a folksy sounding “Letter to America.” These statements outline the basic complaints:
· The US, Israel and Western Allies support Israel and persecute Palestinians · The US violates the sanctity of Muslim Holy Lands by placing troops in Saudi Arabia · The US undermines Islam by supporting secular regimes · The US undermines Islam by exporting Western values · The US obstructs establishment of Shariah (Islamic law) · The US, Israel and Western allies plunder the Middle East oil at paltry prices · The US and its allies are killing Muslims with impunity · The US and UN sanctions and bombing starved Iraqi children · The US has attacked us [Muslims] in Somalia, and supported the Russians in Chechnya, the Indian oppression in Kashmir, and Jewish aggression in Lebanon · The US imposed sanctions on Pakistan for developing nuclear weapons, but takes no action against Israel for developing nuclear weapons, missiles and submarines.
Critics are quick to counter bin Laden’s arguments, explaining that the US has been very supportive of Arab and Muslim interests.
These counterclaims are easily dismissed by the contention that America’s real motives were based on national self-interest, not concerns for Arabs or Muslims. In fact, many of America’s Cold War era policies emanated from the idea that, “The enemy of my enemy is my friend.” The US demonstrated a willingness to support virtually any government, monarch, or dictator that was staunchly anti-communist. The list of former allies reads like a who’s who of tyrants and criminals. The US has also shown its willingness to support regimes that can maintain the economic status quo and ensure US access to resources from bananas and coffee to copper and oil.
Since the US invasion of Afghanistan, the West has brought considerable pressure on al-Qaeda, eliminating its base of operations and disrupting its communications and financial networks. Today (fall 2004), it might be more accurate to talk of al-Qaeda as its alter ego, the World Islamic Front (WIF). The WIF suggests a network of groups that share ideology, and a common enemy (America), but operate independently, each with different goals and objectives.
· Overthrow Pakistan’s military dictator Pervez Musharaff and install an Islamic theocracy with nuclear weapons. · Drive India from Kashmir and unify Kashmir with Pakistan, or establish and independent state in Kashmir. · Establish an Islamic theocracy in Afghanistan · Overthrow the Saudi monarchy and establish an Islamic theocracy · Overthrow Egypt’s President Mubarak and establish an Islamic theocracy · Overthrow the military regime in Algeria and establish an Islamic theocracy (Algerians were about to elect an Islamic government when the military took control). · Establish an independent Islamic state in Mindanao (Philippines). · Establish Islamic governments in every Muslim country – which entails opportunities for expansion of WIF operations in each of these countries, and in any country that obstructs such efforts
Implicit in these individual objectives is the pre-requisite to force the US to withdraw military forces, or military support for the existing regimes. The tactic for forcing US withdrawal is to increase the cost in blood and treasure (lives and money). The attacks of 9/11 imposed an enormous economic cost on America, including: the direct damage, the immediate economic disruption, longer term impacts of consumer and business fear and insecurity, costs for homeland security, costs of the war on terror, and the cost of the Iraq war.
At the end of the Clinton Administration, the US had the largest federal surplus in history; it now has the largest federal deficit in history and the greatest foreign trade deficit. Much of this is not attributable to 9/11, but it has had a significant impact and, more importantly, the US has become increasingly vulnerable to the effects of a new attack.
Arguably, the most potent weapon in the war on terrorism would be a robust economic recovery and resurgence. An economic boom would generate increased tax revenues, ease the deficit and free up money for military and foreign economic assistance. Yet, there has been no clarion call for progress. There have been no initiatives to stimulate new jobs and technology, or inspire consumer and investor confidence, even at a time when corporate profits are high and interest rates historically low. In the 1990s, the Internet and information highway sustained a period of unprecedented prosperity. In the 2000s, there has been no similar stimulus and the US economy languishes, while al-Qaeda, or WIF prepare to deliver another blow.
Bin Laden claims the right to self-defense and retaliation for attacks against the Muslim people and a religious obligation to defend the oppressed and those under attack from non-believers. He argues that citizens are personally responsible for the policies of the leaders they select. They elect their leaders and have the ability to replace them in order to change policies. The American people pay taxes to buy the planes, bombs, tanks and warships used to kill Muslims and steal their wealth. Hence, there are no innocents.
“Thus, if we are attacked, then we have the right to attack back. Whoever has destroyed our villages and towns, then we have the right to destroy their villages and towns. Whoever has stolen our wealth, then we have the right to destroy their economy. And whoever has killed our civilians, then we have a right to kill theirs.“
Although these claims appear harsh, in fact, the US retaliation against the Taliban and al-Qaeda are predicated on the same arguments. The American people have no reservations whatsoever about the justification to attack Afghanistan after 9/11. “You started it” has always been the basis for war and wars have always resulted in civilian casualties. The repugnant aspect of terrorism is that terrorist intentionally target civilians. Regardless of whether they are innocent or culpable for their nation’ actions, they are unarmed, defenseless and usually unaware that an attack is possible.
Bin Laden repeatedly references America’s use of nuclear weapons against the Japanese people in World War II to deflect criticism, apparently subscribing to the theory that two wrongs make a right.
It is sometimes interesting to look for what is not said. One particularly rational argument to justify terrorism would be that the US have accumulated a military force unprecedented in history and uses its overwhelming military power to subjugate people to its will. Unable to engage US forces, dissenters are but two options: to cower in fear and acquiescence, or to strike back wherever possible regardless of whether the targets are military or civilian. To make such arguments, however, risks undermining the confidence and will of al-Qaeda’s activists and those they seek to recruit.
There’s little point in re-hashing the debate over whether there was a connection between Iraq, Saddam Hussein and al-Qaeda. There is no evidence of any meaningful connection. Al-Qaeda reportedly sought Iraqi assistance in procuring chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear (CBRN) weapons, with no result. Al-Qaeda allegedly provided start-up money to Ansar al-Islam to launch operations against the Kurds in Northern Iraq. Saddam Hussein would certainly have had no objection, given the long-standing animosities between his regime and the Kurdish militants.
Prior to the US invasion in March 2003, Iraq was not a base for terrorism, nor was the regime an active supporter of international terrorist groups per se. When the US forces invaded, an expected call to jihad was issued for Muslims everywhere join in fighting the Crusaders.
As a Sunni Muslim, bin Laden decries the presence of infidels defiling the Muslim Holy Places in Mecca, Medina and Jerusalem’s al-Aqsa Mosque. He doesn’t complain about incursions into the Shiite Holy Sites in Karbala and Najaf in Iraq. In fact, Iraq is an anomaly, an artificial state created by the British, who were famous for their divide-and-conquer strategies. The country is comprised of two different Muslim sects, the Sunni and Shia. It’s also home to three ethnic groups - Arabs, Kurds and Assyrians. Even these ethnic groups are divided between the two sects. To add to the complexity, there are Iraqis who’d prefer a secular government and those who’d prefer an Islamic government, if it conformed to their own version of Islam.
This is not the kind of place where al-Qaeda would have been able to inspire a popular uprising by fundamentalist Sunnis, represent only about 32-37% of the population. Al-Qaeda has little commonality with Muslims of the Shia sect, represented by 60-65% of the Iraqis, or with the Kurd(s 15-20%).
Although there was no pre-existing al-Qaeda presence before the US occupation, it’s reasonable to expect one to emerge. Alleged al-Qaeda operatives have already influenced the resistance in Fullujah, a Sunni area. However, Iraq is not likely to be a strategic target for al-Qaeda, except to the extent it presents an opportunity to punish US forces and undermine their interests.
Under Saddam’s Ba’athist regime, there were no competing political parties, or process. Now, as democratic experiment progresses, parties will emerge and dissension will follow as the diverse Iraqi factions fight for power. Shortly after taking control of Iraq, US officials announced that plans would move forward to transfer sovereignty to the Iraqi people through a democratic process, but added that the US would not tolerate a theocratic Islamic government. This policy undermines the concept of democracy and creates a basis for dissension that may lead to the emergence of militants like Moqtada al-Sadr and his Mehdi army, which has fought US forces for control of Najaf.
It’s entirely reasonable to anticipate that terrorism will bloom more quickly than democracy, with, or without encouragement from bin Laden.
In war, or life, everyone likes to think that God is on their side. As mentioned previously, al-Qaeda has had a string of successes that reinforce their belief that Allah is playing on their team. But there are a number of other factors, policies and judgments that have inspired confidence that al-Qaeda could succeed in its monumental undertaking. From bin Laden’s perspective each of the following suggest US weakness, hypocrisy, or duplicity, and thus, provide inspiration and confidence:
1. The US “Westoxication” Iran demonstrates the effect of US culture and colonization. 2. The US support for the Shah of Iran demonstrates the hypocrisy of a commitment to democracy, justice and the rule of law. 3. The Iranian Revolution demonstrates that dedicated Muslims, even Shiites, can overthrow a secular and powerful US-backed regime. 4. President Reagan demonstrates hypocrisy by violating his own terrorism policy and trading arms to Iran for hostages (the Iran-Contra scandal). 5. President Reagan doesn’t retaliate for bombing of US Embassy in Beirut. 6. President Reagan doesn’t retaliate for the murder of 278 U.S. Marines in Beirut. 7. The US withdraws from Lebanon, and the next day invades tiny Grenada. 8. President G.H.W. Bush doesn’t retaliate for the Libyan murder of 259 people on Pan Am 103. 9. The US is afraid to send its armies into Iraq. 10. The US leaves Saddam Hussein in power after the 1991 Gulf War, but imposes collective punishment (sanctions) on the people and children of Iraq. 11. The Afghan mujahadeen defeat the Soviet army. 12. President Clinton withdrew US forces from Somalia after 18 US soldiers were killed. 13. President Clinton is reluctance to commit US forces to protect Muslims in Bosnia and Kosovo
Obviously, there are counter-arguments or justifications for each of the above; after all US forces went to Somalia to avert a humanitarian catastrophe, for example. Failure to retaliate saved Muslim lives, etc. However, the real goal isn’t to win an argument with a zealot, but to win the war against extremists. It’s a war of perceptions. American policies, words and actions have been inconsistent, even contradictory; the outgrowth of this is the Islamist movement. Clearly, a consistent policy that reflects America’s core values is essential to victory.
In his Letter to America, bin Laden outlines a list of demands explaining what he wants of America and Americans. (He offers no quid pro quo) The letter is interesting and reads like a political candidate’s platform statement, in this case, socially conservative, but liberal on foreign policy. It begins, “the first thing we are calling you to is Islam,” followed by a brief pitch. He expresses his sadness that “you are the worst civilization witnessed by the history of mankind.”
It’s easy to dismiss the letter as the ranting of a madman, or ignore it altogether. Yet, anyone who reads it with an open mind will find some points of agreement, regardless of their personal political views.
He then calls upon Americans to “stop your oppression, lies, immorality and debauchery, reject immoral acts of fornications, homosexuality, intoxicants, gambling and trading with interest, and to become people of manners, principles, honor and purity.” It sounds a bit like family values. “You separate religion from your policies, contradicting the pure nature which affirms Absolute Authority to the Lord and your Creator.” It sounds like a Christian fundamentalist. “you are a nation that exploits women like consumer products or advertising tools…” He’s a feminist (and hypocrite). “You have destroyed nature with your industrial waste and gases…;you refuse to sign the Kyoto agreement.” He’s an environmentalist. “your law is the law of the rich and wealthy people.” A liberal. “You captured thousands of Muslims and Arabs, took them into custody with neither reason, court trial, nor even disclosing their names.” And a civil rights advocate. Apparently, Usama bin Laden is a centrist who straddles the political chasm that divides Americans – or maybe an opportunist, who seeks to exploit America for personal gain in the same way as the politicians do.
If there’s a message in the Letter to America, perhaps it is that Americans could become more moderate in their views and more tolerant of other’s views – more unified and less vulnerable to those would destroy them.
Bin Laden has been crystal clear - he and his cohorts are at war with America. It took years for America to understand his declaration of war, but on 9/11, we got the message. The US has created a Department of Homeland Security and introduced a color-coded Terror Alert system. Since then, government officials have warned of possible attacks against a wide variety of targets, including: the Capitol, White House, congressional buildings, CIA headquarters, the Pentagon, monuments, government offices, the NYSE, Chicago Board of Trade, World Bank, IMF, major banks and financial institutions, skyscrapers, nuclear plants, utility plants, chemical plants, oil refineries, oil tank farms, bridges, tunnels, dams, reservoirs shopping malls, ships, ports, airports, airplanes, trains, subways, stadiums, special events ad infinitum. The scope and breadth of the targets suggests that officials have no idea what actually might be targeted. Investigators have unearthed papers, records, videotapes and computer files of suspected terrorists indicating that terrorists have been casing various targets. The implication is that these are the intended targets. However, it’s equally plausible that the alleged terrorist planners are no more decided on the actual targets than the homeland security analysts sounding the alerts.
Then, there are the methods: assassination, biological attack, bombing, chemical attack, cyber attack, guerrilla warfare, hijacking, hostage taking, kidnapping, nuclear attack, vehicular attacks, radiological attack, sabotage, shooting, suicide bombing, surface-to-air missiles, and car or truck bombs. The number of attackers could range between one and twenty, but possibly more. In short, we don’t have any idea of the next targets, or the method of the next attack.
Intelligence analysts are using sophisticated computer software, like Analyst’s Notebook, to record connections between previous attacks, the targets, methods, people, time and date, etc. If al-Qaeda has morphed into a diffused network of unrelated individuals without central command and control the dilemma more closely approaches chaos theory.
Another approach that appears potentially more fruitful is risk analysis. This involves selecting possible targets and analyzing their relative value to a terrorist and relative vulnerability to attack. The idea is that terrorists will take a similar approach and identify targets with the highest possible value and greatest vulnerability.
For instance: One of the greatest fears is the possibility of a dirty bomb, or radiological attack. This entails using conventional explosives to help spread a cloud of radioactive material. Unlike a real nuclear weapon this requires minimal technical expertise, probably little more than a willingness to die from radiation exposure. That’s not a problem for suicidal terrorists seeking martyrdom. The fear factor is extremely high, the effects chilling; this would be the essence of “terror.” TARGET VALUE: HIGH
Conventional explosives are easy to come by, like the fertilizer bomb used in Oklahoma City. The challenge is procuring radioactive material in sufficient quantity- not an easy task. Unless – a terrorist could locate a truck carrying transuranic radioactive waste material from a nuclear plant to the Waste Isolation Pilot Project (WIPP) facility in Carlsbad, New Mexico. To locate such a truck would require Internet access and viola! There’s the route map and description of the trucks, GPS locator system, etc. They’d have to stake out the route for a while to determine the schedule, or maybe just post spotters to call in when trucks are on the road.
Ideally (for the terrorist), they’d attack as the trucks pass through Denver and/or Dallas, and with luck might hit two cities at the same time. The attack is simple; they just load up a truck with explosives, wait for the hard-to-miss flatbed truck (photo available online) with the radioactive casks, swing into the passing lane, pull alongside and push the detonator. Instant, dirty bomb in a major city, or two. TARGET VULNERABILITY: HIGH
“If you don’t stand for something, you’ll fall for anything.” The questions are: What does America really stand for? And, how do its policies and actions and validate the country’s stated goals?
The following comments may sound like a partisan indictment of the Bush administration, but this administration is just the most recent and perhaps best example of the phenomenon. America’s policy toward the Middle East, Muslim nations, or developing nations in general has been fraught with inconsistencies, confused signals and hypocrisy for decades, but rationalized and masked by the smokescreen of freedom, democracy, but not for all. In fact, national self-interest is the primary motivation, as it is for virtually every other nation.
At the 2004 Republican Convention, President George W. Bush affirmed the American creed, but read his words from the perspective of a Palestinian, a devout Muslim, a proud Arab in Syria, or Iraq, or a Persian in Iran. Different people with pride in their lengthy histories, their vibrant cultures and traditions may have a very different reaction than a “patriotic” American audience. They will hear words that sound like evangelical Christianity, disguised as “liberty.” They will hear words that refer to their societies as “sick,” and their ideology as one based on “hate.” They will hear about “an ever-widening circle, constantly growing to reach further and include more.”
After the hear the words, they will ask why, after 50 years of struggle are Palestinians no closer to the freedom and liberty that America promises. Some will ask why the United States gives aid, comfort and support to undemocratic regimes that control the Middle East. Many will ask why America supported Saddam Hussein, but ignored his slaughter of the Kurds for 15 years. Others will ask why America imposed sanctions on Iraq that brought misery and starvation to the common people, but had no effect on Saddam. To many Arabs, Muslims, the words spoken by George Bush will echo with hypocrisy and sound like a Christian Crusade.
“The story of America is the story of expanding liberty: an ever-widening circle, constantly growing to reach further and include more. And we are working to advance liberty in the broader Middle East, because freedom will bring a future of hope, and the peace we all want. And we will prevail. This progress involved careful diplomacy, clear moral purpose, and some tough decisions. Free societies in the Middle East will be hopeful societies, which no longer feed resentments and breed violence for export.”
The president read from letter he received for a soldier in Iraq. "We are transforming a once sick society into a hopeful place The various terrorist enemies we are facing in Iraq, are really aiming at you back in the United States. This is a test of will for our country. We soldiers of yours are doing great and scoring victories in confronting the evil terrorists." The president commented, “That young man is right.”
Returning to his theme throughout the speech, Bush added, “Others understand the historic importance of our work. The terrorists know. They know that a vibrant, successful democracy at the heart of the Middle East will discredit their radical ideology of hate. They know that men and women with hope, and purpose, and dignity do not strap bombs on their bodies and kill the innocent. The terrorists are fighting freedom with all their cunning and cruelty because freedom is their greatest fear and they should be afraid, because freedom is on the march.
I believe in the transformational power of liberty: The wisest use of American strength is to advance freedom. As the citizens of Afghanistan and Iraq seize the moment, their example will send a message of hope throughout a vital region. Palestinians will hear the message that democracy and reform are within their reach, and so is peace with our good friend Israel. Young women across the Middle East will hear the message that their day of equality and justice is coming. Young men will hear the message that national progress and dignity are found in liberty, not tyranny and terror. Reformers, and political prisoners, and exiles will hear the message that their dream of freedom cannot be denied forever. And as freedom advances heart by heart, and nation by nation America will be more secure and the world more peaceful.
By promoting liberty abroad, we will build a safer world. Like generations before us, we have a calling from beyond the stars to stand for freedom. This is the everlasting dream of America and tonight, in this place, that dream is renewed. Now we go forward grateful for our freedom, faithful to our cause, and confident in the future of the greatest nation on earth. God bless you, and may God continue to bless America.
Usama bin Laden, radical clerics and fellow travelers can easily turn America’s words and actions into a call for jihad with compelling rationalization. Even then, we’re told that theirs is an unholy war waged against infidels, and are led to believe that a strain of hatred and perversion runs through Islam. Never are we told of the two forms of “jihad” -the lesser jihad and the greater jihad.
According to author Thomas Lippman, “Jihad is the most over-used and ill-understood word in contemporary Islam.” The Arabic language is laced with subtle nuances and distinctions that are difficult to translate well to other languages. Jihad is better defined as a ‘struggle, a striving or quest” than a war. The greater jihad describes an ongoing personal striving to attain faith in Allah (or God) and to live a virtuous life in adherence to the pillars of the faith. This is the same struggle against temptation faced by all religious people, and would better describe the life of a Buddhist monk than a terrorist.
The lesser jihad describes a call to defend the faith against infidels who spurn Islam and persecute its believers. The Koran calls on Muslim to defend their religion against those who would deny them the right, or ability to practice their faith. Lippman explains, “”It calls for war on the infidels and for tolerance; it brands the unbelievers as doomed infidels, yet teaches that whoever believes in God and lives virtuously, whether Muslim or not, will be admitted to Paradise.” He quotes a passage that says, “Fight for the sake of Allah those who fight against you, but do not attack them first. Allah does not love the transgressors.” Historically, the wars fought to defend Islam were not wars of religious conversion.
Bin Laden and others who declare war on the West are on perilous ground and risk eternal damnation for being transgressors, but they are not the first, the only, or the last to twist holy words to their benefit. Unfortunately, they have been given ample basis for their claims that Islam is under attack, in both words and deeds.
At the end of the day, the radical Islamists are not a religious movement waging holy war. Their rhetoric is wrapped in religious tones, but their underlying grievances are political, geopolitical, economic and cultural. From this perspective, the Islamist movement is no different than many other ethnic and nationalist struggles.
The common thread that weaves violent political movements together is fear. People, all people, fear the loss of political influence. They fear that others will plunder their resources, depriving them of potential prosperity. They fear change, modernization and loss of control over their lives. They fear that the young will abandon the churches, mosques and synagogues for physical and material gratification. They fear the influence of mass media and its ability to subvert the values of the young. They fear education if it undermines the teachings of their religion. They fear a future they can’t control, or even comprehend.
These themes are as common among traditionalist Muslims as they are with traditionalist Jews and Christians. In fact, they’re familiar to all of us. These fears resonate loudest among those people who have least. For people mired in poverty, lacking hope and frustrated by political and economic systems they can neither understand or control, religion holds meaning and offers hope, at least for future salvation. It’s for this reason that Usama bin Laden ties his appeals to religion and to jihad, promising those who heed the call and become martyrs will find Paradise.
What differentiates Islamists from other rebels, militants, guerrillas, insurgents or freedom fighters are their tactics, their organizational structure and their global appeal. Unlike most nationalist, irredentist or separatist movements, Islamists are expressing geopolitical grievances shared by people in many nations. Their tactics are virtually unconstrained, apparently following the unrestricted warfare doctrine expressed by Chinese theorists. Their organizational structure also differs from traditional intra-state militants in that al-Qaeda operates like a franchise, establishing associations with kindred groups and providing various levels of support. This is more a result of the global nature of the associated groups than a unique tactic. Only the far-reaching global appeal of the cause is truly unique.
A discussion of concepts for dealing with international Islamist terrorism will be available on the Global Focus website in the section on Counter-Terrorism.